Introduction: It is now nearly twelve months since my book, Throwing Thunderbolts, was published. Since that date I have collected the following corrections and a few additions to the text.

Cover: the grenadier’s sabre is not the correct model (1767) but a later one. The handle grip should not be wrapped in black leather.

p.11 The judgement of the King took several votes in the National Convention;

p.21: Chateau Pignon some photos of the post today are available on this page;

http://jpdugene.com/fiches_rando/zerkupe.htm

p.22 footnote 61: the reference for this is Phipps, West, p.160.

p.22, first para:  The Battle of Mas Deu was the day before on the 19 May. François-Xavier de Llucia’s report, which details the fighting, was dated the 20th. Phipps gives the date as the 20 May.

p.23 Marcé was sent to the guillotine on 29 January 1794.

p.26 d’Elbée was wounded at Cholet not killed.

p.28 footnote 100: Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Grey was 1^st Earl Grey.

p.31: The battle of Le Cateau is normally associated with the action on the 29 March 1794. The action on the 26 April is more often called the Battle of Beaumont.

p.34, 2^nd Paragraph: Robespierre went to the guillotine on the 28 July.

p.34, 3^rd Paragraph: Le Quesnoy fell on the 15 August.

p.34, footnote 126: the page number should be 321.

p.42, Casa Fuorte (from Phipps) should probably read Casa Fuerte which means ‘strong house’ in Spanish.

p.43, 1^st paragraph: the date at the end should be the 25 November.

p.49, 2^nd Paragraph; the spelling of the river is IJssel.

p.62, footnote 248: the correct brigadier is Major General Welbore Ellis Doyle the brother of John.

p.97, May 12; the frigate squadron was commanded by Lawrence William Halsted of HMS Phoenix.

p.104: Forlì is spelt with an accent on the i.

p.110; The surrender at Fishguard was actually early on the morning of the 24 February.

p.128: In 1791, the infantry regiments were also reorganised with the chasseur companies being disbanded. The two battalions now each had 8 companies of fusiliers and one of grenadiers. (Before 1791 the companies had two platoons but were now single platoon organisations. The grenadier company could therefore provide a company for each battalion under the new scheme.)

p.131: The Law of 22 July 1792 resulted in 32 battalions which were called reserve battalions or ‘Soissons’ battalions or simply volontaires nationaux battalions.

p.140: line 3, ‘should deploy up to 64 men’

p.147, 1^st Paragraph of Prussia section: each musketeer and grenadier battalion had 2x 6pdr and each fusilier battalion had 1x 3pdr gun. Showalter gives two guns per regiment but Hofschrӧer is clear in his Prussian Napoleonic Tactics 1792 –1815, p.10 (Osprey, 2011).

p.148 2^nd Paragraph: Showalter describes the Kürassiers as wearing breastplates, but they were withdrawn following an order in 1790 and none were worn during our period. (Hofschroer,  Prussian Cavalry of the Napoleonic Wars (I) 1792 –1807, p13 (Osprey, 1985).

p.150: the numbers for the war record of the Prussian army 1793–5 should be nine victories in 12 engagements involving more than 20,000 men and five of 10 involving less than 20,000 men.

p.168: bottom of page: The army of Naples had not been in action since 1746 and was considered a poor performer overall. (Reference: Schneid p.213; P. Ball in Armies and Enemies of Napoleon pp.61-63).

p.207: The upper half of the northern bank of the Stein Bach and other slopes were particularly steep and are only passable by infantry and cavalry at quarter of their normal speed. Here is a new version of the battlefield map with the historical deployment at 10:00 a.m. marked.

p.207: Prussian Forces at Pirmasens
The Prussian force at Pirmasens is commonly described as approximately 8,000 men strong. Thus Digby Smith’s Handbook (citing Schulz and Jany) gives 8,000, a number given by Gaston Bodart (Militär-historisches Kriegs-Lexikon (1618-1905), 1905, p. 279), while Peter Hofschroer (Prussian Napoleonic Tactics 1792–1815, Osprey, 2011, p.21) gives the total as 7–8,000 men. Ethan Stoefe (Testing The Narrative Of Prussian Decline: The Rhineland Campaign of 1793, 2021) gives the respective strengths as 15,000 French and 9,000 Prussians, and of the latter only 7,000 were deployed (citing Grawert (pp.87–99, which on p.97 states that captured French officers estimated that, of the 22,000 men at Hornbach camp. 15,000 took part in the battle. Colin (p.399) shows Moreaux with 12,000 men, while Chuquet (Les Guerres de la Révolution…. VIII. Wissembourg (1793), 1890, p.162) describes how 14,000 men left the French camp at Hornbach to march to Pirmasens. Colin (Campagne de 1793 en Alsace et dans le Palatinat, 1902, vol.I, pp. 87 & 397) gives the strength of Moreaux’s force as approximately 12,000 men based on battalion level detail, probably including both officers and other ranks. However he also mentions that Moreaux himself claimed to have marched with 10,000 men.
Mittler (Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften: Pirmasens und Kaiserslautern, 1893) states that ‘in the Duke of Braunschweig Corps there were: 18 battalions, 4 jäger companies, 25 squadrons, 7½ batteries, around 13,000 men.’ Mittler used 500 men (15 figures at 33:1) for each battalion, 120 men for each squadron (3-4 figures), 150 men for each battery (p.375). Grawert (Ausführliche Beschreibung der Schlacht bei Pirmasenz, Den 14. September 1793 in Drei Abschnitten: nebst einem Bataillen-Plan und dazu Gehöriger General-Charte 1796, p.70) gives the Duke of Brunswick’s entire corps as 12,000 strong on the day, from which the strength of the average battalion of infantry or 5 squadron regiment of cavalry can be estimated at 453 men. As a point of reference Hofschröer (Prussian Line Infantry 1792–1815, 1984, p.4) gives the wartime establishment of a Prussian musketeer battalion as 816 men of all ranks (approx. 25 figures).
Of the total corps, von Kleist’s brigade remained posted 3⅓ miles to the west of Pirmasens holding the key post of Ketterich, supported by the von Lottum Dragoons and Captain Meyer’s horse battery. Meanwhile von Voss’s fusilier and jäger brigade together with the von Wolffradt Hussars were deployed in the outpost screen to the west and north of Pirmasens, commanded by von Wolffradt himself. Consequently only two squadrons of the Wolffradt Hussars took any part of the battle. These two squadrons commanded by Major von Erichson joined the pursuit at the end of the fighting near Gerschberg (Grawert, p.89, Gerschberg is just off the map near the Eischberg). Furthermore Captain Wille’s 6pdr battery only arrived on the battlefield at the end of the battle (Grawert, p.83). Thus, only 11 battalions, 12 squadrons (including the two squadrons of the hussars) and 5 batteries were at Pirmasens, an estimated total, based on Mittler’s numbers, of 7,690 men. The attached OOB and playsheet reflects the corrections described above. Grawert’s numbers suggest the total strength would be 6,795 men.
Although Black Powder™ is not dependent on a figure scale, it is important to use one when creating historical scenarios because battles are an exercise in occupation of terrain and the troops need to occupy a realistic extent of terrain. If we take Mittler’s numbers the Prussian infantry battalions are just over 13 figures strong (at 33:1 figure scale) having deducted the separately represented schützen and battalion gun crews. The equivalent number from Grawert’s data is 12 figures. These numbers fall at the boundary between STANDARD and SMALL sized units in the game. Taking both sides, the average battalion size in the game is 16-17 figures, which sets the size of the STANDARD battalion are 14–19 figures, while SMALL units are 10–13 figures.
The Black Powder™ Rules (p.14) specify that most of the units should be STANDARD size, consequently in Throwing Thunderbolts, I was generous to the Prussians and made them STANDARD size, reflecting their superiority over their French opposite numbers. Hence the play sheet in Throwing Thunderbolts across the two sides has 26 STANDARD units, six SMALL units and eight LARGE units (all French). However, if you wish you can switch the Prussian infantry battalions to SMALL, which changes this profile to six STANDARD units, 20 SMALL units and eight LARGE units. The play sheet reflecting these smaller Prussian units is given here.
Finally, the Last Argument of Kings supplement for Eighteenth Century warfare gives Prussian infantry the SUPERBLY DRILLED special rule which gives them a free move in all formations if they fail their order. I chose not to do this as the army is not that of Frederick the Great, but it does have a high level of potential re-rolls available.

p.209: The French Forces at Pirmasens

The TINY unit of Grenadiers of the 30e Régiment d’Infanterie is not separately included in the list of units recorded by Colin (Campagnes, p.397) as marching with Moreaux to Pirmasens. However Colin does mention both companies of grenadiers separately in describing the action (p.401). Chuquet mentions two companies of grenadiers but attributes them to the 8e R.I.(Wissembourg, p.166; N.B. the 8e R.I. served in the Austrian Netherlands in 1793). These were the grenadier companies of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the regiment, the rest of the second battalion not being in the field (see Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, p.284).The 1792 regulations do have the grenadiers of the two battalions of an infantry regiment acting together as a separate unit, but you may prefer to include them in the 30e R.I., making it a LARGE unit of 25 figures with the statistics 4/8/5+/4/40 points. If you keep the Grenadiers as a separate unit give them an extra melee dice to reflect their grenadier status; 1/2/4+/1/16 pts (TINY units are underpowered in the standard rules relative to their unit size).

The order of battle for the French force excludes the 4e Cavalerie, which Colin includes in those units that left the Hornbach camp with Moreaux. However the unit was not involved in the fighting because it was held back in reserve, although it did help to cover the retreat, losing only two men and four horses missing. If you want to include the 4e Cavalerie they would be two SMALL units, each of five figures, with the statistics 1/7/4+/2 , the special rule Heavy Cavalry +1 and each worth 37 points. The amended page can be found here.

The numbers of the different guns in the French reserve artillery vary in the sources;
Colin, Campagne, p.398: 34 guns: 14x 12-pdr, 13x 8-pdr, 1 of 4-pdr and 6x 6” howitzers (as in Nafziger)
20 guns: 4x 12-pdr, 12x 8-pdr and 6 howitzers (Adj. Gen. Duvignau’s report)
19 guns: 4x 12-pdr, 10 of 8-pdr, and 5 howitzers (Minister of War)
Colin, Campagne, p.405: ‘We lost during this day 3 12-pdrs, 1 8-pdr, 13 4-pdr, 2 howitzers, …’
Colin, Campagne, p.406: ‘They brought back to the Hornbach camp, as position artillery one 12-pounder, nine 8-pounders, and 3 howitzers.’
Colin, Campagne, p.407: Moreaux’s report: ‘Fearing then for the few cannons and caissons that I had been able to bring back with me, I decided to withdraw: thus was caused the loss of six position pieces, which you will find on the statement which will be sent to you’ (i.e: the 3 12-pdrs, 1 8-pdr, and 2 howitzers mentioned above)
Chuquet, Wissembourg, p.164: ‘the artillery of the park, composed of twenty-two position pieces’.
Grawert’s map shows a French grand battery of 36 guns.
The reported losses along with the guns returned to camp suggest that the French position artillery was four 12-pounders, ten 8-pounders, and five 6-inch howitzers, or 19 guns in total (i.e. the same as the Minister of War tally given above). While the other sources suggest a range from 36 guns (which may include some of the battalion guns), 34 guns or 20 guns, it is now clear that Colin’s 14 12-pdrs is a misprint and the real number was four. This gives the most likely strength of the French position artillery was four 12-pounders, ten 8-pounders, and five 6-inch howitzers, or 19 guns in total. As written the scenario with 30 guns is at the top end of this range, it would thus be more accurate to remove one each of the 8-pdr and 12-pdr models/companies.

The OOB shows the French cavalry, chasseurs and dragoons, with Lequoy because Moreaux referred to the Chasseurs being with his left (Lequoy) while the dragoons were held in reserve. However Colin places them with Guillaume’s advanced guard column on the right, and while Mittler is undecided in his text, he maps them as a separate column on the French right. Later historians seem to have assumed that the cavalry would be with the advanced guard as in other French OOB’s of the period, however our eyewitnesses Moreaux and Grawert do not follow this approach and Guillaume’s own account describes only infantry in his own column and further describes the cavalry supporting his advance from the left (Colin, p.408). At the end of the day, the French brigades/columns were so close together during the attack (at one point constrained to a frontage of 400 paces), it probably is of little importance.

pp.210–211: Battalion Guns; Consistent with the correction for p.147, the number of models for the Prussian battalion guns at Pirmasens needs to be increased; Prinz zu Baden’s brigade should have 3 models (21 points); von Roeder’s Brigade 2 (14); von Herzberg’s brigade 3 (21); von Romberg’s Brigade 3 (21).

In the scenarios for Linselles and Pirmasens I have represented the battalion gun sections in Black Powder as single models with shooting dice of 2/1/1 dependent on range. In the Boxtel scenario they are given shooting dice of 1/1/1. In part this reflects the larger battalions at Boxtel. In the Mondovi scenario, by which time the demi-brigades artillery allocations have been reduced from six gun companies to three gun sections, I used the battalion guns as single units of three and four guns with shooting dice of 2/1/1.

In designing the Linselles and Pirmasens scenarios I was trying to keep close to the ‘rules as written’, on reflection I prefer to use fire dice of 1/1/1 rather than 2/1/1 for the two battalion gun sections in those scenarios. There are still issues with these small two guns sections when compared to the effect of a six gun company represented by one model with 3/2/1 dice. In my own games, for these two gun sections as well as the 1/1/1 shooting dice, I also employ a range dependent to hit score of (4+/5+/6) and a range dependent save against disorder  (6, 5+, 3+). Furthermore, at long range, a score of 5 or 6 in this disorder save roll also saves the hit, before the normal save roll. These changes give effects that are equivalent to that of the 6 gun companies.

These changes influence the way the points are worked out for the battalion gun sections. My assumption is that a standard Black Powder artillery model/unit represents 6 guns for the 3/2/1 shooting dice. Consequently when the number of guns represented is changed, the points value changes in relation to the number of guns. Thus a two gun section is worth only a third of the points of a six gun section. Alternatively an 8-gun company is worth 133% of a standard unit. These changes are reflected in the points values given above.

Like wise the points values of French battalion gun sections become; Right Column = 14, Centre column = 35 and Left Column = 35. The points total for the army becomes 1282.

You may of choose to brigade the battalion guns into 6 gun units with 3/2/1 fire dice as recommended in the rules and supplements, but, as a rule, I think this is too anachronistic for our period. However Pirmasens provides the exception, Brunswick formed the battalions guns of Kalckstein’s Division into a single battery of 10 guns (the other two were deployed with their battalion), which would best be represented by a two models, one with 3/2/1 dice and the other with 2/1/1 dice.

It maybe useful to restate my rules for battalion gun sections;
a) They are considered as separate units attached to their parent units.
b) They will move with the orders of the parent unit when within 6 cm/inches.
c) They will be affected by any adverse break test result on the parent unit, regardless of position.
d) When in base-to-base contact with the parent unit they contribute to any closing fire.
e) They cannot provide support to their parent unit.
f) Their effect on morale/saving throws is restricted to -1 at all ranges.

p.210-211: These tables show the schützen organised by brigade, as was commonly the case, but at Pirmasens the schützen from von Kalckstein’s division were detached from their battalions and sent to the Steinbach sector of the battlefield with the grenadier battalion of the Prinz Heinrich regiment. Mittler’s map of the battle suggests that these schützen were 150 men (5 figures) strong, rather than the regulation 10 men per company or 240 men for this division.

p.210: Generalmajor von Herzberg is Johann Karl, Graf von Herzberg, born 19/09/1731. He joined as a private soldier in 1746.

p.222: The Représentants: the third mention of the Représentants should singular.

Two further optional Scenario Special Rules

The Pre-Game Bombardment of Fort Mulgrave:

The artillery in Fort Mulgrave is difficult to estimate fully. While we know that the redoubt held 22 guns, we don’t know the effect of the pre-assault bombardment by Bonaparte’s artillery. Originally I chose three models but you may prefer to increase this to four, adding an additional Standard Smoothbore model. They would be arranged as follows; Alternatively you may wish to reflect as a variable in the scenario rules. At the beginning of the scenario, the French player should roll a D6 and on a score of 1 or 2, the bombardment was less effective and an extra Standard Smoothbore model is added to the redoubt;  

Under Black Powder rules, the artillery in the Fort Mulgrave will break if needing a Break test while in a position to support if the infantry is involved in the close combat but not if the artillery are in the close combat (because artillery cannot be supported).

How awake was the Allied defence?:

At the beginning of the scenario the Allies roll 1D6, on a roll of 5 or 6 the Staff Rating of the Allies is increased to 8 and Izquierdo gains a re-roll.

p.225: The Caz R.I. Malaga and the Picquet line should both have the ‘skirmish’ ability. The Piquet line can also be split into two ‘tiny’ units, one Spanish and one British/Naples (the R.I. Bologna was Neapolitan).

p.229: The horse artillery company probably had four 8-pdr Gribeauval cannon and two 6-inch howitzers.

p.233: (New para graph in Deployment section) In order to slow down the deployment of the French infantry, they are not allowed to use ‘brigade moves’ in turns one and two.

p.234: In Victory Conditions section; The game length will be 16 turns and the British go first.

p.246: Additional Notes on the Terrain

The wooded terrain affects all movement on the hills, the text ‘when below the 600m contour’ should be deleted (this was originally referring to the slopes of the hill rather than the woods).

One source claims the bridges on the Corsaglia were destroyed and that the Corsaglia itself was unfordable further north around Lesegno (Guerre della Alpi, p.296). However, the Corsaglia was forded by the French at Moline (Fabry, Memoires, p.103).  One source suggests that the stone bridge at Torre Mondovi was intact on the day of the battle (Moris & Krebs, Campagnes, p.420).  However, other sources suggest that the bridge at Torre was captured and repaired by Guieu during the night before the battle (Guerre della Alpi, p.297; Fabry, Memoires, p.103), although they may be referring to the bridge near the T. Casotto.

p.247, footnote 141: Casale battalion not Canale.

p.248: : The commander’s correct name was Colonnello Brigadiere Gioan Battista Civalieri di Masio, he was 56 years old in 1796 and had previously commanded the second regiment of the Legion Leggere.

As described on p.154, the Legion was disbanded on April 7, 1795, and with its forces these two light regiments were formed. Therefore the heading Legione Reale delle Truppe Leggere should be deleted. (N.B. In his account Fabry still refers to them as the Légion Légère.)

The 20:1 figure numbers for the 1° Batt. 2° Reggimento del Cacciatori and for the 1° Battaglione del Cacciatori Colli-Ricci should be 18 not 11. This means the column total should be 113 not 97. Secondly the OOB reference includes a merged ‘battalion’ of the 6 coys of the chasseur and grenadier flank companies of the 3 battalions of the two Reggimenti del Cacciatori, with a strength of 154 men. I chose not to include them as the strength of the Piedmontese force was already well beyond Fabry’s ‘barely 2,000 men’. To include this unit, add a TINY unit of 6 figures (1:33) with stats of 1/1/+4/1 (19 points).

From 20 March 1796, Colli-Ricci commanded the ‘regiment’ of two Caccciatori battalions. (La Guerra del Alpi, p.54). The companies that made up Colli-Ricci’s Cacciatori two battalions were from the following regiments;

(Source: La Regie Truppe Sarde, p.27, for facings see pp.128–129, noting modifications on p.131)

The chart below summarises the history of the Sardinia-Piedmont light infantry during the War of the First Coalition based on La Regie Truppe Sarde, pp.27-33.

Looking at the research again it is likely that the two units of Corpo Franco each represent 4 companies of two figures each. These companies only had 60-85 men in February 1796 (Nafziger OOB).

p.249: The numbers of the demi-brigades given here are the numbers from the 2nd Amalgamation as denoted by the cadre demi-brigades de bataille from the 1st Amalgamation. The 2nd Amalgamations happened on 10 April 1796 (19e), 14 October 1795 (46e), 29 February 1796 (84e). (See Smith, Napoleon’s Regiments, pp. 78, 94, 126). These numbers were changed in May 1796 by a lottery, which allocated new numbers – the 46e became the 39e, the 19e became the 69e and the 84e became the 25e. Furthermore until new flags were available, which in the Armée d’Italie, didn’t happen until after December 1796, the flags carried by these units were those of the cadre demi-brigades de bataille, 19e, 46e and 84e. These flags were all of the 1794 pattern, with the 2nd battalion carrying one design while the 1st and 3rd carried identical flags of a different design. (see Letrun, Charrie, p.17, Krebs & Moris, PJ93).

p.250: The commander’s name was Colonnello Brigadiere Gioan Battista Civalieri di Masio.

To improve the Piedmontese prospects, Colli-Ricci could be represented as sub-commander. He would use the Staff Rating of 7 and could issue movement and rally rules but not ‘follow me’ orders.

p.251, last line: the date of the battle of Borghetto was the 30 May not the 21^st (see page 83).

p.266: The reserve artillery should be divided into four stands: Northern redoubt (1 strength point), Southern redoubt (3), Davidovich (3) and Sebottendorf (3).

p.267: Marmont’s artillery should be recorded as horse artillery.

p.268: Weydenfeld’s detachment arrives on turn five of the six turns.